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Abstract: This paper proposes a new definition o/corruption that includes as a part o/the definition 
the potential harm that corruption originating/imn business decisions can calise. The pllrpose o/this 
paper is to enlarge the scope 0/ corruption research and encourage/iltllre research to consider the 
/'Ole o/bllsiness and managerial decision-making in corruption in addition to the prevalentj()cus 0/ 
corruption research on the public official. 
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Introduction 
O DR INTEREST IN studying cOITuption has gained momentum during the past two decades with social scientists, economists, policy makers, management scholars and business ethicists adding to the kalcidoscope of corruption litcrature. Neverthe-
less, existing definitions of cOlTuption available in literahlre are used rcpetitively 
in current works. These definitions confine thcmselves to the cxplanation that a corrupt act 
amounts to deviating from some norms (Scott, 1972; Huntington, 1968) or laws (Leff, 1964) 
or jumping thc queue (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) or securing an undue favour or making a 
private gain (Nye, 1967) amongst other notable ones. And thesc definitions treat corruption 
more as an issue of non-compliance with rules, norms or the law and focus on the role of 
the public official. But cOITuption many a time is more than non-compliance of some norms, 
rules or the law. It can originate from ostensibly commercially prudent business decisions 
made by companies and their executives to 'get the job done' (could range from an amcndment 
of an unsuitable law to approval of anything that business needs) and may involve lobbying 
public officials, donating to election campaigns, active bribery of public officials (bccause 
the company's competitors could be doing the same or the business environmcnt is such that 
public officials demand bribes). And as a decision outcome, whether intended or not, the 
outcome may have the potential of inter-alia jeopardising human rights, thc environment, 
issues of sustainable development and undermine stakeholder rights as in Enron (see Prashad, 
2002) or Shell in Nigeria (see Whecler et.al, 2002). Therefore, corruption originating from 
business decisions needs to be included as a part of the literature on cOITuption definitions. 
The study of cOITuption to a large extent has focused on government corruption, the corrupt 
public officials, cOlTIlption in public office, the nature and causes of such corruption (Scott, 
1972; Rose-Ackermann, 1978; Bhagwati, 1982; Klitgaard, 1988; Theobald, 1990; Alatas, 
1990; Elliot, 1997). This could be because the study of corruption originated in the domain 
of political science and economics. Ovcr the years, the study of cOITuption has become an 
important area of study for management scholars and business cthicists too. It is argued that 
the compelling circumstances of business that many a time lead managers to takc part in 
corrupt acts ought to be included as another aspect of our study of cOlTIlption as a subject. 
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Therefore, corruption in business and in international trade as originating from the business 
sector of society needs to be an impOliant inclusion in corruption literature. As a starting 
point of generating future research in this direction, a more inclusive definition of corruption 
in business is proposed in this paper. The proposed definition has a clear inclusion that cor-
ruption originating from business decisions can have a serious impact on crucial stakeholder. 
The first section of the paper discusses at length typical definitions and discussions in liter-
ature as to what constitutes corruption. This is followed by an analysis of the study of cor-
ruption in society in the second section. The third section discusses the phenomenon of 
cotnlption in business which is complemented by the fourth and concluding section of the 
paper proposing a more inclusive definition of corruption to encourage future corruption 
research from another perspective. 
Corruption: Existing Definitions 
What constitutes conuption and acts of corruption is a question of debate amongst scholars; 
however, they agree on certain common features evident in an act of c0l111ption. Scott 
(1972:3) sums this up in his book, "Con'uption, we would all agree, involves a deviation 
from certain standards of behaviour. " This gives rise to a series of pertinent questions as to 
what those standards of behaviour are from which one deviates? What are the criteria to es-
tablish those standards and who lays them down? Whose behaviour is to be checked against 
those standards? Scott (1972:3) mentions three broad criteria to answer these questions, each 
with a distinct analytical focus but overlapping with each other, namely: public interest, 
public opinion, and legal norms. He debates what constitutes "public interest" and what is 
"public opinion" and issues of law. He concludes that both public interest and public opinion 
have different connotations in different situations and may be difficult to use as yardsticks 
in all cases. If compliance with the law is the expected standard of behaviour, then are we 
nan-owing down the issue of conuption to contractarian requirements and in the process are 
we relegating a moral problem to a contractarian solution? The requirement of compliance 
with law would still harbour lingering doubts as to what is acceptable behaviour and what 
is not, and whether the law in question is unconstitutional or repressive. Scott (1972:5) ad-
dresses this dilemma aptly when he writes: 
Our conception of corruption does not cover political systems that are, in Aristotelian 
terms, "corrupt" in that they systematically serve the interests of special groups or sec-
tors. A given regime may be biased or repressive; it may consistently favour the interests, 
say, of the aristocracy, big business, a single ethnic group or a singlc region while it 
represses other demands. 
Scott's definition mentions "special groups" whose interests are served, albeit within the 
law by designs of a political structure. Some formal special interest groups who expressly 
promote the interest oftheir own groups within the law are professional bodies of accountants, 
lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers and trade associations, wherein the rules are set for 
satisfying specific group interests, and in so far as they disadvantage and inflict an unwar-
ranted cost on society, such systems still remain corrupt. This happens if in the process of 
serving their own interest, they act to the detriment of society. Likewise, the theOlY of 
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'Milgram's six degrees of freedom' I or the concept of chinese guanxi 2 or the old boys net-
work are indicators of the prevalence ofinfonnal groups of people who can end up scrving 
their group interest to the detriment of others. The activities of such groups may meet legal 
compliance but that compliance may not rule out pursuit of corrupt advantage over others. 
Legal compliance, however, as a criterion is not rulcd out and scholars have used words 
like "nonns", "formal duties", "extra legal", "system of public order" to define COiTuption 
and the underlying notion of legal compliance. Leff (1964:510) has highlighted the outcome 
of a corrupt act, namely: private gain at the expcnse of common good. He defines corruption 
as: 
COlTuption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influencc 
over the actions ofthe bureaucracy. As such, the existence of corruption per se indicates 
only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greatcr extent 
than would otherwise be the case. 
Leff's definition strengthens the use of legal compliance as a criterion, but at the same time 
discusses influence to a "greater extent than would othelwise be the case" as an outcome of 
the process. However, Leff's use of the word "extra-legal" and his definition and related 
work is critically assessed in the work of Alatas (1990: 177-182). 
In addition, Alatas (1990:3) has categorised conl.lption into seven distinct types: transactive, 
extortive, investive, defensive, nepotistic, autogenic and supportive and provides a context-
specific insight into COiTuption in public office. Huntington (1968:492) defines corruption 
as, "behaviour of public officials, which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve 
private ends." Huntington highlights the private nature of gain made through a corrupt 
transaction by public officials. Nye's (1967:567) definition is more comprehensive: 
Behaviour, which deviates from the fonnal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) 
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status 
gains: or violates rules against the exercise of celiain types of private-regarding influence. 
Nye (1967) offers a better understanding by mentioning the possible beneficiaries of a public 
official's corrupt transaction. Rogow and Lasswell (1963: 132) define it from the viewpoint 
of public good or common good, thus: 
A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic order 
and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A system of public 
or civic order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the common 
interest for special advantage are corrupt. 
Klitgaard (1988:75) contends that illicit behaviour (corruption) flourishes when agents 
(public officials) have monopoly power over clients by virtue of great discretionary powers 
that they (public officials) command by way of occupying a public office. On the other hand 
I Milgram's six degrees of freedom is based on an experiment conducted by Prof. Milgram on a hypothesis that 
everyone in this world is connected through a short chain of acquaintances (approximately 6 persons in a chain). 
2 The underlying theme in a Guanxi relationship is a reciprocal relationship for mutual benefit between people in 
business or otherwise. Guanxi is a word coined during Confucian times to indicate various relationships between 
the Emperor and people and between networks of people. 
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the agent's (public official's) accountability as an agent to the principal (the nation's elect-
orate) is weak. In his work detailing control mechanisms for COlTUption, he has defined these 
ingredients of COlTllption in an informal equation thus: Corruption= Monopoly + Discre-
tion-Accountability. In other words, conuption is a situation of monopoly arising out of the 
discretion my powers vested in a public official's position without being accountable for 
one's actions. 
A general consensus is noticed amongst these scholars: that conuption is for private gain 
at the expense of common good, a deviation from nonns, and subvelis the rule of law and 
all the above definitions refer to the role of a public official. 'Private gain at the expense of 
common good' provides the ground of moral reasoning against corruption in these definitions. 
However, literature also provides exceptions to what is perceived as common good, but in 
reality may not be fair on an individual nor satisfy basic principles of equity and justice. For 
instance, in war time Germany the Nazi perception of common good involved imprisonment 
and extermination of Jews. Rose-Ackerman (1978:9) explains this situation in her book 
when she writes, "One does not condemn a Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration 
camp." The morality of this act of conuption ovenides issues oflegal compliance and private 
gain. Hence, the definition of corruption needs contextual application. Johnston (1989: 16) 
asselis the contextual nature of conuption when he writes "there are many fonns of cOlTllption, 
differing in pmiicipants, settings, stakes, techniques, and cultural legitimacy." 
We can conclude from these definitions and related discussion that corruption is private 
gain at public cost and involves deviation from rules, norms and the law. It is involves a 
trade in discretionary powers of a public official with an underlying element of a quid pro 
quo relationship between the public official and the beneficimy ofthe discretionary powers. 
It usually has the ingredient of illegal and immoral gratification. 
However, there are exceptions to the presence of illegal and immoral gratification in a 
corrupt transaction as explored in the work of Abueva (1966). For instance in celiain cultural 
situations, the discretionary powers are exercised by a public official's conupt act to provide 
private gain to a close circle of people at public costs, without the underlying element of 
reciprocity. These beneficiaries (people) could belong to the public official's own family, 
extended family, circle of friends and associates, persons from one's tribe or ethnic back-
ground or province. Such misuse of powers vested in a public office of national trust is un-
dertaken by the public official to express love, devotion, loyalty towards one's family, tribe, 
province or friends and associates, although the public official is not paid for it by the bene-
ficiaries. This exception to the standard quid pro quo practice also amounts to conuption 
because the actions are designed to provide an unfair advantage to certain individuals or a 
section of society. 
Corruption and Society 
Corruption in our society has been studied from a number of angles in its various aspects. 
Perry (1997) views conuption as a part of human activity in the geographical context and 
has discussed the causes, proximates, characteristics and functions of political corruption in 
his work. Many noted authors have studied the causes of cOlTllption, its consequences, and 
its OCCUlTence as a part of political structures as well as the public official's role in conuption 
(Scott, 1972; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Klitgaard, 1988; Alatas, 1990; Theobald, 1990; Mauro, 
1995; Mauro, 1997; Johnston, 1997; Peny, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Hanis, 2003). Corruption 
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has also been seen as a result of "political structures and institutions" (Heywood, 1997). 
Publications discussing corruption-control and installation of control mechanisms too havc 
focused on the public official (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
Some scholars have explored the cOlTelation between the stages of a nation's development 
and their influence on conuption and found that increased corruption is experienced as an 
economy takes off and developing nations experience increased corruption in times of rapid 
development (Wraith & Simpkins, 1963; Theobald, 1990). In certain situations corruption 
has been seen as a positive OCCUlTence. Altman (1989) considered corruption and black 
market in thc erstwhile Soviet Union as a "market correction mechanism", correcting the 
Soviet government's price and distribution control policies. Tillman (1968:437-443) con-
sidered the black market price as a "mandatory pricing system." Szeftel (1983) in his study 
of private enterprises in Zambia felt corruption led to 'formation of capital and enterprise' 
as Zambian public officials who amassed wealth through conupt means became entrepreneurs 
in later life. Corruption can also cut down bureaucracy and save time in celiain organizational 
situations, writes Klitgaard (1988). However, authors such as Leff (1964); Scott (1972); 
Szeftel (1983); Klitgaard (1988) and Theobald (1990) have extensively argued against cor-
ruption asserting that the negative side of corruption far outweighs its perceived contextual 
benefits. 
Elliot (1997) in her work analyses three different actors in the arena of corruption in society, 
namely: elected officials and politicians, non-elected officials (identified as judiciary and 
the bureaucracy) and private actors (which includes business). Elliot (1997) also distinguishes 
between "grand conuption" and "petty corruption". She describes 'grand cOlTuption' as 
corruption occurring at the highest levels of government involving decisions such as "pro-
curement of mil it my equipment, civilian aircraft, or infrastructure or broad policy decisions 
about the allocation of credit or industrial subsidies" (Elliot, 1997: 178). While "petty COITllp-
tion" according to Elliot, occurs when private actors interact with non-elected government 
officials for transactions such as "taxes, regulations, licensing requirements and the discre-
tionary allocation of government benefits." 
In recent times, scholars have studied the impact of conuption on society (eg: Alatas, 
1990). Empirical studies, such as Mauro (1997) provide tentative evidence about the eco-
nomic effects (i.e. lowers growth and investment) of corruption. Mauro (1998) provided the 
first cross-country (across sovereign nations) empirical evidence that corruption affects the 
composition of government expenditure and adversely impacts government expenditure on 
education. Gupta, Demello, Sharan (2001) suggest in their study that nations with higher 
incidence of cOlTuption also experience higher military expenditure in relation to both a na-
tion's GDP and government spending. Leite & Weidmann (2002), in their empirical studies 
of natural resource rich nations, who are otherwise poor, found that such nations experience 
slow economic growth due to the incidence of rent-seeking activities of public officials and 
comlption. Gupta, Davoodi & Tiongson (2002) concluded in their empirical study that nations 
with high levels of corruption experience adverse consequences on infant mortality rates, 
higher percentage of low birth weight babies and higher dropout rates in primary schools 
(the authors used Corruption Perception Indices3 of each country selected for the study and 
3 COlTuption Perception Indices are annual indices released by Transparency International. They convey the level 
of corruption in a country as perceived by its people (business leaders, press, scholars, accountants are usually 
surveyed) 
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then used individual country data against the above thrce variables to support their findings). 
Tanzi (1998:45) explains the qualitative effects of corruption on the economy, namely: dis-
tOliion of markets, distortion of allocation of resources, distortion of incentives, corruption 
as an arbitraty tax, increase in poverty, reduction of the lcgitimacy of a free market mechanism 
and distortion of the fundamental role of government. 
From the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the phenomenon of corruption has been 
ovetwhelmingly studied with a focus on the public official and presence of corruption has 
serious negative impact on our society. Although it is important to study the role of the 
public official in corruption, we also need to remind ourselves that public officials are the 
'demand side of corruption' as they seek wealth and influence by trading the discretionary 
powers oftheir office but any act oftrading involves the presence of a supply side of corrup-
tion. In acknowledging that, we need to remind ourselves in our research that the 'supply 
side of corruption' needs to be explored in our research of corruption with equal importance. 
Companies and their business managers are the most prominent actors on the supply side of 
conllption and our study of corruption will remain incomplete if we lose sight ofthis aspect. 
It may also be worthwhile to note here, that our study of corruption is largely based on 
post mortem of exposed cases of conllption of public officials, companies that have either 
confessed under amnesty (such as Lockheed and 500 other US companies in the seventies) 
or those who have been exposed by the media, and the correlation that one finds between 
indices of cot1'uption developed by NGO's such as Transparency International and economic 
indicators ofthe World Bank or IMF. What we all possibly miss out is the study of corruption 
that is hidden from the public eye and which has never been exposed. In other words our 
study and understanding of the phenomenon of corruption in business and society is based 
on 'corruption that has been exposed' or 'unsuccessful corruption'. Our study of corruption 
is therefore not based on the study of 'successful corruption'. Perry (1997) has indirectly 
made a reference to this aspect in his book where he writes "totally successful corruption is 
totally unsuspected cOlTIlption". As an attempt to address this major limitation in our study 
of conllption it is imperative that corruption researchers pay patiicular attention to corruption 
in business. 
Corruption in Business 
Corruption in business is a subset of the wider phenomenon of corruption prevalent in our 
society. It usually occurs during the interface between business managers and public officials. 
Business managers seek dispensation of favours (both legitimate and illegitimate) and public 
officials command the discretion to dispense those favours, many a times at a cost to the 
public and society. Some examples of legitimate (within law) favours sought by business 
could be grant of trading rights, licenses, petmits, award of contracts, tenders and amendment 
of laws to suit business interest. Illegitimate favours could range from tax avoidance; sup-
pression of wrongdoing to employees and stakeholders, including illegal acts and anything 
that maybe ultravires the law that serves the economic interests of business. On the other 
hand, public officials command discretionary powers to satisfy both the legitimate and ille-
gitimate favours that business may need. Thus, there is room for trade of these discretionary 
powers, for a qllid pro qllo between public officials and business managers as explained in 
Rose-Ackerman (1978); Elliot (1997); Han'is (2003) amongst a few notable ones. The desire 
to trade these discretionary powers by a public official has often becn referred to as "rent-
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seeking behaviour" (Rose-Ackermann, 1978; Bhagwati, 1982; Klitgaard, 1988, Bardhan, 
1997). Likewise, the desire to pay for those discretionaty powers and make private gain at 
public cost can be termed as gain-seeking behaviour of business managers. COlTIlption also 
takes place in the private sector (without the involvement of public officials) between business 
managers and between companies colluding to perform an act of corruption, termed as 
"private to private corruption" (Argandonna, 2003). 
The gain-seeking behaviour of corporations and their business managers achieved through 
the satisfaction ofthe "rent-seeking behaviour" of public officials breaches the fundamental 
principle of distributive justice and undermines the fiducialY role of business as a custodian 
of societal wealth and resources. In addition, such COlTIlpt collusions violate the utilitarian 
role of business to achieve the economic welfare of society. This logic has prompted the 
fOlmulation of anti-colTuption legislation both at national, regional and international levels 
to protect the economic interests of society and protect society from an immoral situation 
of private gain at public costs. Many a time, such private gain inflicts huge public costs on 
society as evidenced in the collapses of fraudulent corporations in US during 2001-2002, 
and in recent times in 2008-2009. These corporate collapses have hurt society's older gener-
ations (pension funds), the middle class (small investors and employees), eroded societal 
wealth (banks and financial institutions) requiring tax payer bailouts that future generations 
will have to pay for. 
Many of these acts of quid pro qllo (trade of discretionaty powers) and collusion between 
public officials and companies/business managers get exposed in the media, usually too late, 
either as allegations or actual scandals with evidence from time to time. Not a single working 
day passes without exposure of the OCCUlTence of corruption in some part of the world or 
the other as is evidenced from the daily email service run by Transparency International (an 
NGO fighting cOlTIlption) exposing cOlTIlption. To a great extent this has prompted an unpre-
cedented awareness and action against cOlTIlption in many parts ofthe world. Besides national 
governments, the international community and global organizations such as the OECD4, 
UN5, IMFG, World Bank and regional organizations in Europe, the Americas and Africa 
have recognized the incidence of corruption in public office and international trade. In Feb-
ruaty 1999, the OECD criminalised bribery of foreign public officials through the OECD 
Anti-bribery Convention, 1999. The document is internationally significant as it is signed 
by 34 nations who control 70% of exports and 90% of direct foreign investment worldwide 
(Pieth, 1999). 
Moreover, twelve international anti-conuption conferences under the aegis of Transparency 
International; the role played by (TI) Transparency International's 60 national chapters, the 
strengthening of the FCPA7 in USA; the regional anti-corruption conventions in Africa, 
America and Europe and the United Nations Convention against COlTuption, 2003 indicate 
deep concern about the prevalence of corruption in international business and public life. 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003 (UNCAP) is by far the most 
comprehensive intemational effort covering all aspects of corruption in public life. These 
4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
5 United Nations 
6 International Monetary Fund 
7 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
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international efforts imply that corruption is an issue of significance and does occur in the 
interactions between public officials and corporations/ business managers. 
However, international efforts in the fon11 of such signed conventions lack uniform legis-
lative enforceability across all signatory nations as well as non-signatories due to various 
reasons ranging from varying stages of ratification ofthese instruments to differences in the 
judicial and legislative structures of individual signatOlY nations (Pieth, 1999) and the weak 
governance situations in many parts of the world. Legislation has not been successful in 
curbing the incidence of corruption in international business as is evident from the Bribe 
Payer's Index8 2002 and 2006 that have been published after the OECD Convention came 
into effect. The indices indicate that the propensity to pay bribes to secure business has in-
creased over the years even after the OECD Anti Bribery Convention, 1999 came into effect. 
Effective curbing of COlTuption in international business through legislation is still in its 
nascent stages, and will take years to catch up with the reality of doing business in many 
patis of the world. Adding to this difficulty is a perception on part of business managers that 
cOlTuption is a pati of the business environment and they do not think of stakeholder issues 
or corporate social responsibility when they take part in any act of corruption. For instance, 
CEOs in India acknowledged in 1993 that their companies constantly engaged in bribery 
and payoffs and they justified their actions on grounds of "extOliion" (by the Indian govern-
ment officials) as they were "forced to bribe" (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999:226). Thus, these 
business managers did not see it as a matter of right or wrong or as a stakeholder issue but 
as a matter of their business environment that forces them to pay a bribe or take part in cor-
ruption. 
This line of thought on part of managers is also found in Roy (2005) where in a survey 
of 41 multinational business managers conducted at Mumbai, India it was revealed that 
business managers while dealing with corruption-related situations do not really think of 
corporate social responsibility or stakeholder issues. Instead they think in terms of business 
oppOliunities that could be lost due to non-bribelY, competitor actions, and of their own career 
graphs. Ifbribely/corruption was required to achieve these objectives then it was considered 
as a normal business practice because everyone else was doing so. Interestingly in the same 
survey when it was pointed out to the velY same managers that in some situations their conupt 
collusion with public officials can actually harm the environment (when prescribed pollution 
control measures are avoided by paying a bribe to the inspecting government official), human 
rights issues (when land is procured by the government from fat111ers without satisfactOlY 
compensation and then given to the company as industrial land for setting up the company's 
manufacturing operations) and various other stakeholder issues, the managers conceded 
without a single exception, that they had never thought in terms of a link between their 
business decisions (conupt collusion with public officials) and stakeholder issues such as 
human rights, issues of the environment or sustainable development but considered it as a 
matter of commercial compulsion. 
The same arguments were also offered in the infamous Lockheed case and by 500 US 
companies who confessed to overseas bribelY (under amnesty) before the US Senate during 
the seventies (Jacoby et aI., 1977) saying that bribes had to be paid as a matter of commercial 
prudence. This is a timeless argument noticed in corruption literature. Thus, in order to 
8 Bribe Payer's Index (BPI) is an index of 'propensity to pay a bribe' by major exporting/ trading nations. The index 
is published by Transparency International and available at www.lransparency.org 
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achieve the economic objectives, the very same company may enter into COlTUpt transactions 
with the justification that other companies are doing it or it is thc norm of doing business in 
country 'x' or country 'y'. And while doing so, the decision-making managers taking part 
in corrupt acts actually ignore that it is a corporate social responsibility issue more so because 
corrupt acts can have substantial stakeholder impact. For instance the corrupt collusion 
between Enron and the public officials in India had severe stakeholder implications that in-
cluded violation of human rights in the form of displacemcnt of over 2000 people, loss of 
their livelihood, illcgal detentions and physical torture of stakeholder protestors (Prasad, 
2002). Likewise, the much researched and written about Shell in Nigeria case also speaks 
of human rights violations, COlTUpt acts by the Nigerian military government and Shell 
(Manby, 2000; Wheeler et.al, 2002). 
An Inclusive Definition of Corruption 
It is thus highly relevant to define cOlTuption in business to include stakeholder issues as 
that will help all of us enlarge the frame of reference of corruption research in clear terms 
and at the same time could alert business managers that corrupt actions on their part ought 
to be seen in the larger context of stakeholder impact rather than as an economic transaction 
under whatever compulsion. As a starting point to generate fmiher research and debate, 
corruption in business ought to be defined as: 
A phenomenon that originates Fom managerial decisions that can involve lobbying, 
nepotism, making campaign donations, or any other legal/ illegal and/or immoral 
gratification in cash or kind in exchange/or securing an 'unethical advantage' over 
others in business and/or in society and such acts impact stakeholder issues olgrave 
importance such as violation ol human rights, destruction ol the environment and un-
dermining olsustainable development. 
The word 'unethical advantage' hcre refers to COlTupt acts that lack justification from a 
stakeholder perspective, regardless of the commercial compulsion or cven legal sanction. A 
number of high profile cases such as Enron, Shell in Nigeria and corporate collapses such 
as Parmalat, World. com have demonstrated that corrupt business conduct has the potential 
to undermine human rights, democracy and sustainable development, amongst other stake-
holder obligations. The explicit mention of human rights and sustainable development is 
essential to the core of all stakeholder commitments that any business operation has to honour 
in today's global society. Donaldson & Dunfee (1999) have argued that an unwritten social 
contract exists between busincss and society and the core social clause in the contract between 
business and society requires business has to honour its stakeholder obligations. 
The unethical advantages sought by companies and managers over others in business 
and/or society can manifest itself in various forms, such as bribes paid to secure land with 
oil deposits without caring about the loss of livelihood of the community which had owned 
the land, and without putting back a part of the oil revenues for the betterment of the com-
munity as in the case of Shell's operations in Ogoni land Nigeria extensively explored in 
the works of Man by (2000) and Wheeler et al (2002). It can also include winning commercial 
tenders and contracts through bribelY, obtaining of promotional articles in return for paid 
adveliisements, bribes paid to escape legal obligations such installation of pollution control 
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equipment or treatment of effluents before they are discharged in waterways. Such situations 
can also include usage of political influence for passage offavourable legislation by govel11-
ments, installation and support for military regimes that commit human rights abuses, cor-
pOl'ate actions that result in wilful damage to means of livelihood, wilful damage to the en-
viromnent, compromising on human right issues and issues linked to sustainable development. 
In conclusion, defining C01Tuption to include the role and the possible stakeholder impact 
of corruption originating from business decisions is a new direction for further research 
contributing to a better business and society osmosis. 
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